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Model Based Safety Analysis for an Unmanned Aerial System
Jean-Charles Chaudemar, Eric Bensana and Christel Seguin
Abstract— This paper aims at describing safety architectures
of autonomous systems by using Event-B formal method. The
autonomous systems combine various activities which can be
organised in layers. The Event-B formalism well supports
the rigorous design of this kind of systems. Its refinement
mechanism allows a progressive modelling by checking the
correctness and the relevance of the models by discharging
proof obligations. The application of the Event-B method within
the framework of layered architecture specification enables the
emergence of desired global properties with relation to layer
interactions. The safety objectives are derived in each layer
and they involve static and dynamic properties such as an
independence property, a redundant property or a sequential
property. The originality of our approach is to consider a
refinement process between two layers in which the abstract
model is the model of the lower layer. In our modelling,
we distinguish nominal behaviour and abnormal behaviour in
order to well establish failure propagation in our architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
For autonomous vehicles, the safe control systems are
complex systems and they need various skills for their de-
velopment. These skills concern for instance human-machine
interaction, computer science or mechanical capabilities. All
these skills, necessary for a safe control system, could be
organised in a layered architecture allowing a better under-
standing of this complex system [1], [2]. But this layered
architecture involves a stringent design of the interfaces
between the layers in order to ensure the relevance of the
system and the respect of the safety requirements. The
Event-B method is a formal language which has been devel-
oped to correctly specify and to iteratively model complex
system with refinement mechanism [3]. Refinement is an
incremental technique aiming at transforming an abstract
model into a concrete model i.e a model that contains more
details in its specification or a model that is closer to an
implementation.
This article aims at proposing, with the Event-B method, an
approach of formal specification of the layered architecture
of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (called later UAV) control
system within the framework of a safety analysis. The
statement of properties related to the interactions between the
layers enables to correctly specify the nominal and abnormal
behaviour of the UAV control system.
The paper is organised as follows: after a short presentation
of the experimental UAV, the next section shows the context
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of this study. The third section deals with the Event-B models
of our layered architecture with its corresponding properties.
Then, before concluding, we state the first verification carried
out to ensure the relevance of these models and the validation
of safety objectives.
II. CASE STUDY PRESENTATION
A. Context
The experimental UAV is an autonomous mini YAMAHA
helicopter called RMAX which is equipped with a specific
avionics developed by ONERA. This avionics enables the
evolution or the update of pilot, of guidance and of navi-
gation parameters. This avionics has three modes of pilot
which can be selected manually or autonomously. The first
mode corresponds to the manual pilot function. The second
mode is related to a rough automatic pilot function whereas
the third mode is connected to a more precise automatic
pilot. These three modes of pilot are connected to sensors
and actuators in order to control the UAV. Moreover, to
ensure a greater decision autonomy, some functions, known
as “high level” functions such as planning and supervision,
manage the operations related to a given mission. Thus, the
UAV control system is organized into a hierarchical logical
architecture with functional layers, which is detailed in the
next sub-section.
The UAV mission consists of several operation phases com-
bined with different pilot modes and with air traffic zones:
automatic takeoff, flight at visual line of sight of a pilot
within an unmanned zone, hovering beyond visual line of
sight of a pilot within a manned zone, or manual landing.
As our objectives are to assess qualitative and quantitative
failure conditions on our system, we deal with an operational
scenario from warm-up until the landing, while we focus on
the most critical operation phase which is the phase of a
flight beyond visual line of sight of a pilot within a manned
zone.
B. Layered Architecture
According to [4], to define a system architecture enables
to better understand and to better master a complex system.
The proposal of a layered architecture is often motivated by a
composition of the system with elements from various fields
which could be associated with functionalities or temporal
aspects [1]. In our study, the adopted architecture consists
of 3 functional layers: operation, function, equipment. The
equipment layer relates to the functionalities fulfilled by
control system equipment like actuators and sensors which
are used for the control of the UAV moving. At the top of
this layer, there is the layer of command functions such as for
instance various functions of pilot and the guidance function.
The last layer of our architecture is the operation layer that
mainly gathers the applications of decision-making aid, the
applications of operation management related to the target
mission and the applications of global supervision of this
system.
As regards the temporal aspects of these layers, we can
note that the response time increases with the level of the
appropriate layer. Thus, to reply to environmental stimuli
or physical phenomena evolving/moving quickly like the
variation of wind speeds or turbulences, the sensors and
the actuators shall have very low response times (about
0,3s). Likewise, the command functions connected to this
equipment carry out control computations with a response
time a little higher, by including the response time of the
equipment while preserving the control stability (about a
few seconds). Lastly, the response time of the operation
layer takes into account more important temporal horizons
of analysis to determine the actions or the operations to be
performed (about a few tens of seconds).
With regard to decision autonomy, this layered architecture
also emphasizes a functional hierarchy between the layers.
The upper layer dealing with operation management coordi-
nates and supervises the activities of the command functions
of the consecutive layer below. Likewise, the function layer
controls and supervises the activities of equipment.
Layered architectures also have an advantage for the system
safety [2]. In our approach, safety mechanisms in terms of
failure detection, isolation and reconfiguration (commonly
called FDIR) are set up in each layer. The function layer
also deals with tasks due to an undetected fault or a non
recovered fault in the equipment layer. If the function layer
fails to solve this anomaly, the operation layer could decide to
change the operation mode by switching into either back-up
mode (Back) while going on the mission, or interrupted mode
(Abort) while performing a flight back to a pre-established
waypoint, or cancelled mode (Canc) while the UAV falls
out. For the first two layers, the failure modes which are
considered mainly relate to erroneous mode (Erroneous) and
lost mode (Lost) which state respectively that equipment
or function return erroneous values, and that equipment or
function do not return any more output data.
Fig. 1 shows the duality of the system behaviour within
our layered architecture for the nominal case and for the
abnormal case. On the right hand side of this figure, there
are failure mode automata associated with each component
of the corresponding layer on the left hand side of this figure.
In the next sub-section, we present the safety properties to
be met by our system while taking into account the layered
architecture.
C. Safety Properties
The process of the safety analysis enables to have a greater
confidence in the reliability and the harmlessness of a critical
system. This analysis states the safety properties or the safety
requirements that the system shall meet. We identify some
failure events because of their effects on people, on goods, or
Fig. 1. Layered architecture of our UAV.
on the system itself. A classification of these events accord-
ing to their effects allows to define criticality levels related
to these events. In a perspective of future regulations on the
insertion of UAVs in civil air traffic zones, we use processes
developed for civil aircraft. In our case study, we assume that
a catastrophic event is the event of the UAV crash within a
manned zone. Thus, we define two main safety properties
to be met. The qualitative safety property is so stated: “a
single failure shall not lead to the catastrophic event of crash
within a manned zone”. Likewise, the quantitative safety
property is expressed in these terms: “the probability of
occurrence of this crash event shall be lower than 10−9 per
flight hour”. With the evolution of international standards for
avionics development process, the use of formal methods
makes easier the verification and the validation of these
properties. Accordingly, for the specification of the UAV
control system, we chose to use jointly the formal language
called AltaRica which is a specific method in the study of
failure propagation [5], [6] and Event-B formalism [3].
In this paper, we mainly deal with the Event-B specification
of the control system in order to satisfy the qualitative safety
property stated above.
However, other properties characterize this architecture in
order to preserve the functional integrity of the system. The
importance of these properties is shown in the relations
between the layers. Indeed, the coordination of the activities
between the layers is essential for the safe behaviour of the
UAV. This coordination results in the supply of “services”
from a layer for the need of the consecutive layer above. A
service is the coordinated and collective activity of some
components of the layer which provides this service. All
the activities of layer elements are not services: only the
activities which are visible to the consecutive upper layer
are services. A service can be seen as an abstract machine
which fulfils a specific functionality of the consecutive layer
above. To provide a service can require the use of services of
lower layers. Thus, for instance, the services of FDIR used
in a layer could rely on the presence of redundant equipment
which could be activated or not.
With relation to these services, we distinguish three families
of useful properties to be satisfied for safety in each layer:
1) Properties related to the static aspects of a service
• “Selection” of the events which are useful for the
setting up of a service;
• “independence” between events in a layer;
• “equivalence” between events in a layer;
• “redundancy” defined as the conjunction of the
property of independence and the property of
equivalence.
2) Properties related to the dynamic aspects of a service
• “Temporal Constraints” between events described
by [7], [8].
3) Properties related to the knowledge of the components
• “Observability” of the component state.
In the next section, we roughly draw an outline of the con-
sidered method to specify these properties and to guarantee
their respect during the design of the UAV control system.
III. EVENT-B MODELLING
A. Adopted Approach
The interest of Event-B in our study relies on its modelling
which enables to formally express properties validated by
proofs during the design of the system models. It also
relies on its refinement principle which allows to control
the complexity of a system with a progressive and safe
development.
Moreover, these principles of the Event-B method are well
suited to the specification of our architecture. They were
used in a study of specification with B method for the
safety in a layered architecture [2]. The approach used by
the authors of this study consists in regarding the highest
layer as an abstraction of the system. The abstract model
is so refined by adding one by one the lower layers. In a
layer, the components manage the behaviour of the lower
layer components. The principle of refinement in this study
consists in including the model of the component of the
consecutive layer below.
Conversely, in our approach, we assume that the properties
defined in the previous section are essential to describe the
relations between the entities of the layers of our architecture.
The concept of “services” so involves a refinement whose
abstract machine is the model of the lower layer. Indeed,
in a relation between two successive layers, the lower layer
could fulfil many activities with relation to its components
but the activities which are actually performed depend on the
requests of the consecutive layer above. The refinement states
that the behaviour of the higher layer manages the behaviour
of the consecutive layer below. This refinement keeps on until
we get a correct implementation of the relation between these
layers. Thus, for instance, the assumptions set up at the func-
tion level compel the activity of the equipment; likewise the
Fig. 2. Our refinement approach.
conditions or properties to be satisfied at the operation level
enable to refine the function carrying out. Fig. 2 emphasizes
the approach of the adopted Event-B modelling to specify the
relations between layers. From abstract models (EQUIP 0,
FUNCT 0), we refine our specification until considering the
concrete model of the UAV control system (possibly until
models EQUIP FCT 3, FCT OPE 2). Moreover, the use of
a mechanism of model fusion (for example, between models
FUNCT 0 and EQUIP FCT 1) will allow to reinforce the
specification of our layered architecture as described by [9],
[10].
B. Function Layer Modelling
As said above, the modelling of the function layer relies
on a first model called EQUIP 0 which describes services
that could be provided by the consecutive layer below that is
the equipment layer. These services correspond to equipment
activities which are useful for the functions. These services
take into account the nominal behaviour and the abnormal
behaviour. These services are:
• either explicitly requested by functions such as for
example the services related to the actuators;
• or implicitly requested because such services depend
on external phenomena like for instance sensor mea-
surement or equipment monitoring.
Then, this first abstract model is refined in order to
emphasize function activities which are related to the ser-
vices above. The refining model is called EQUIP FCT 1. In
parallel, we develop another function model that is comple-
mentary to EQUIP FCT 1 and whose purpose is to describe
function activities which are useful for the operation layer
above.
1) First Abstract Model:
a) Static Features: The “Context” of the first abstract
model called EQUIP C0 describes the static parameters
belonging to the abstract model of the equipment layer of
the control system architecture. It defines sets of abstract
objects and relations between some elements of these sets
which are static features of this layer.
For instance, we define an abstract set EQUIPMENT
composed of disjoint subsets SENSOR and ACTUATOR.
The distinct functional states of the enumerated set E FLAG
are characterized in the following way:
active state meaning that the equipment is active (for
example, an actuator carries out a movement or
a sensor sends measures);
off off state of equipment; this state mainly charac-
terizes out of order equipment due to failures;
idle state meaning that the equipment is on standby
(for instance, an actuator waits for a new com-
mand);
spare spare state of equipment; we assume that all
redundant components are supplied but are not
active at the initialisation.
The distinct states for abnormal behaviour belong to the
enumerated set E STATUS. These states represent the values
of words for the monitoring of each piece of equipment:
ok the health monitoring state of equipment is
nominal;
erroneous equipment returns erroneous values in the
domain of specified values;
lost equipment does not return values or returns
values that are out of the specified value
domain.
Likewise, some functions deal with the links between the
elements of the sets above. The bijective function act cmd
means that each actuator is associated with a control word.
The bijective function eqt surv expresses that all equipment
has a monitoring word for its surveillance.
The bijective function eqt mode states that all equipment
has a word associated with its functional state.
The bijective function eqt obs expresses that all equipment
has a word of observation.
The partial function e fault class allows to perform the
failure identification and isolation principles. A fault is
associated with equipment. Some faults can also affect the
upper layers of the system architecture.
The total function eqt cat indicates that each piece of
equipment belongs to a category of equivalent equipment
having either only the piece of equipment itself or this piece
of equipment and other ones.
b) Dynamic Features: The “Machine” EQUIP 0 of
this model describes the dynamic features of the equipment
layer.
We describe in this model three events representing the
nominal behaviour of the equipment and three events
representing the situations of failure.
The event s send states the sending of a measure by a
sensor, independently of the requests of any function.
We put in parameters a given sensor sen and a given
value of measure v. The update of the sensor measure
(value(eqt obs(sen)) := v) so depends on the functional
state and on the dysfunctional state of the equipment (the
sensor is active i.e. it can measure data, but it can be in a
nominal or erroneous state).
The event a activate deals with the activation of an
actuator that depends on the requests of a function.
The requests are interpreted by a condition related to a
command. We have as parameters a given actuator act.
The actuator is activated provided that it is beforehand
in a idle state ( flag(eqt mode(act)) = idle), that the
command corresponding to this actuator is available
with a correct value ( e cmd(act cmd(act)) = TRUE)
and that the actuator is in a nominal or erroneous state
(e status(eqt surv(act)) 6= lost).
The event a return indicates the return of a given
actuator act to a permanent and stable position
(flag(eqt mode(act)) := idle) as a result of an
action or a commanded movement, with an indicator
v. This event is thus consecutive with an event of
activation of an actuator. We have as parameters a
given actuator act and an indicator value v. This return
is performed provided that the actuator is beforehand
in an active state (flag(eqt mode(act)) = active),
that this command associated with this actuator is not
valid any more (e cmd(act cmd(act)) = FALSE)
and that the actuator is in a nominal or erroneous state
(e status(eqt surv(act)) 6= lost).
The following events of diagnosis and of failure
reconfiguration are independent of requests of any
function. The event detect err is an event of detection of
an anomaly leading to the sending of erroneous values
for a given piece of equipment. The parameters of this
event are equipment eqt and a fault or a failure fault.
The fault is detected and the piece of equipment switches
in the erroneous state provided that it is beforehand in
a nominal active state ( flag(eqt mode(eqt)) = active
and e status(eqt surv(eqt)) = ok) and that the fault
belongs to the fault set affecting this piece of equipment
(fault 7→ eqt ∈ e fault class).
The event detect lost is an event of detection of an
anomaly leading to the loss of a given piece of equipment.
The parameters of this event are equipment eqt and a
fault or a failure fault. The fault is detected and the
piece of equipment switches in the lost state provided
that it is beforehand in a nominal or erroneous
active state (flag(eqt mode(eqt)) = active and
e status(eqt surv(eqt)) 6= lost) and that the fault
belongs to the fault set affecting this piece of equipment
(fault 7→ eqt ∈ e fault class).
The event recover constitutes the step of reconfiguration
following a fault. We have as parameters equipment eq
and an associated redundant piece of equipment eq red.
The event is triggered provided that the given piece of
equipment is in a lost state (( flag(eqt mode(eq)) = active
and e status(eqt surv(eq)) = lost), that the
distinct redundant piece of equipment is inactive
(flag(eqt mode(eq red)) = spare). The actions resulting
relate to an activation of the redundant piece of equipment
and an outage of the lost piece of equipment
(flag := flag C− {eqt mode(eq red) 7→
active, eqt mode(eq) 7→ off}) and a decrease in
the number of redundant equipment remaining (
nb(eqt cat(eq)) := nb(eqt cat(eq))− 1).
c) Properties.: The main properties of our model are of
two sorts. On the one hand, we find properties related to the
static features through the axioms defined in the “Context”
of the model. They are mainly axioms of connection between
elements of abstract sets. For example, following axioms:
axm12 :act cmd ∈ ACTUATOR COMMAND
axm13 :eqt surv ∈ EQUIPMENT 
E SURVEILLANCE
axm18 :e fault class ∈ DEFAULT 7→ EQUIPMENT
define properties guaranteeing a command word for each
modelled actuator and a word of monitoring for each mod-
elled piece of equipment, as well as a property of identifica-
tion of fault classes associated with the piece of equipment.
On the other hand, some properties are closely related to the
dynamics of the system. They are described by invariants
at the level of the “Machine” of the model. The most
important properties relating to the dynamic features relate to
the quantification (nb) of redundant or equivalent equipment
(subset SS EQUIPMENT) according to functional states of
this piece of equipment:
inv6 :∀sse ·((sse ∈ SS EQUIPMENT ∧ nb(sse) >
1 ) ⇔ (sse ∈ SS EQUIPMENT ∧ (∃a, b ·(a ∈
sse ∧ b ∈ sse ∧ a 6= b ∧ flag(eqt mode(b)) =
spare ∧ (flag(eqt mode(a)) = active ∨
flag(eqt mode(a)) = idle)))))
inv7 :∀sse ·((sse ∈ SS EQUIPMENT ∧ nb(sse) =
1 )⇔ (sse ∈ SS EQUIPMENT ∧ (∃a ·(a ∈ sse ∧
flag(eqt mode(a)) 6= off ) ∧ (∀b ·((b ∈ sse ∧ a 6=
b)⇒ (b ∈ sse ∧ flag(eqt mode(b)) = off ))))))
inv8 :∀sse ·((sse ∈ SS EQUIPMENT ∧ nb(sse) =
0 )⇔ (sse ∈ SS EQUIPMENT ∧ (∀a ·(a ∈ sse ∧
flag(eqt mode(a)) = off ))))
2) Refining Model:
a) Dynamic Features: The machine EQUIP FCT 1 re-
fining this abstract model of equipment states the relations
or the exchanges between the equipment and function layers.
This machine supplements the abstract events by new events
specifying the updates of data exchanged between these
layers. We find for example events describing the availability
of a command (command value set at TRUE) and the end of
availability of a command (command value set at FALSE)
towards the actuators.
This event send cmd t describes the assignment of value
TRUE to the command of an actuator through a given
function fct.
We also describe in this refinement some events of detection
and reconfiguration if there is equipment declared ok whereas
the return values are erroneous.
b) Properties: Among the invariants of this model, the
main property relating to the inter layer relations relates to
the confirmation of the erroneous values sent by equipment
in the erroneous state.




grd1 : fct ∈ SL FUNCT
grd2 : f flag(fct mode(fct)) = f executing
grd3 : e cmd(fct cmd(fct)) = FALSE
then
act1 : e cmd(fct cmd(fct)) := TRUE
end
inv9 :∀eq ·((eq ∈ EQUIPMENT ∧
flag(eqt mode(eq)) = active ∧
e status(eqt surv(eq)) = erroneous) ⇒
(f eval e(value(eqt obs(eq))) = FALSE ))
This invariant inv9 expresses the fact that if active equipment
is erroneous then the assessment of the observations of this
equipment states that the return values are false.
3) Abstract Model of Function: We define an abstract
model of the behaviour of functions called FUNCT 0 relating
to function layer. This model shows the steps of the activity
of a function: the activation by a request, the acquisition
of resources and the carrying out. We also describe the
abnormal behaviour of the functions using events of detection
and reconfiguration (f recover hereafter).





grd1 : fct ∈ L FUNCT
grd2 : fct eq ∈ L FUNCT
grd3 : fct 6= fct eq
grd4 : f status(fct surv(fct)) = f lost
grd5 : f status(fct surv(fct eq)) = f ok
grd6 : f nb(fct cat(fct)) > 1
grd7 : fct eq ∈ fct cat(fct)
then
act1 : f nb(fct cat(fct)) := f nb(fct cat(fct))−1
end
The modelling of this behavior is rather similar to that
modelling carried out for the equipment abstract behaviour.
C. Synthesis and Verification
a) Synthesis: Fig. 3 summarizes the current composi-
tion of the equipment and function layers in terms of events.
The first model of functions is a result of the composition
(not yet validated with Rodin platform) of models FUNCT 0
and EQUIP FCT 1.
b) Verification: Our modelling is carried out with the
Rodin platform which is a support of Event-B method as in-
dicated by [11]. This platform integrates provers allowing to
validate rules necessary for the relevance and the correctness
of the modelling. For instance, there are invariant preserva-
tion rules or rules of feasibility of an initialisation action. In
our model, some proofs relating to the rule of feasibility of an
initialisation action are not discharged automatically because
Fig. 3. Function layer modelling.
of indeterminism associated with some initialisations. For the
discharge of these proofs, we are able either to modify the
model in order to correct possible writing errors, or to carry
out the proofs interactively by using the integrated provers, or
to show the satisfaction of these invalidated rules manually.
The verification of the whole of the proof obligation rules
enables to ensure the correctness of the model with relation
to a priori knowledge of the system or the informal specifi-
cation stated at the beginning of the system design.
Currently, we have managed to validate the whole of the
proof obligation rules of the abstract model of equipment.
As indicated above, the errors we have met were especially
related to an incorrect writing of some invariants or axioms.
The remedial actions have consisted in modifying these
invariants or axioms, and in adding new axioms allowing
to better specify the characteristics of the used sets. For
example, we have defined sensors and actuators, which were
then arranged in well identified categories of redundant
equipment. Moreover, we have defined a theorem of “dead-
lock freedom” guaranteeing the permanent activation of one
event among the modelled events. This theorem has been
also validated for this first abstract model.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Within the framework of the modelling of an autonomous
UAV, the study in progress consists in specifying in Event-B
an architecture for a control system that integrates some
constraints of safety. The structuring of the system in func-
tional layers is the approach usually met in the literature [1]
with respect to the levels of autonomy described by [12].
In the case of some satellites, autonomy is associated with
criteria of reliability and safety which compel to reinforce
functional architecture in introducing into the layers some
components which enable to produce mechanisms of FDIR
as indicated by [13]. For our case of study, we are inspired
by the architecture proposed by [13], then we have extended
this concept by identifying properties between the layers for
better satisfying qualitative objectives of safety such as “a
single failure shall not lead to the total loss of the system”.
Moreover, we have also associated failure modes with each
component of our architecture.
However, the contribution of our work is mainly in the formal
modelling of the adopted architecture. The B modelling of
a layered architecture by [2], and the B modelling of the
concept of FDIR by [14] focus more particularly on the
specification of the software applications and less on the
specification of the system by taking into account some
imposed constraints of safety. For example, the number of
redundant equipment may be used without emphasizing its
impact on quality of the architecture with relation to the
reliability and the safety like in this modelling [14]. Other
formal methods enable to take into account jointly hardware
and software aspects of an embedded system relating to
the criteria of the reliability and the safety. According to
[15], PVS language has helped teams of NASA to specify
platforms of highly reliable computers. The language of
specification and the tools of analysis of PVS have enabled
to correct many errors of design of the critical systems.
Likewise, the formal language AltaRica is used more and
more in the industrial field for the assessment of the safety
of complex systems [5], [16]. We have undertaken a first
modelling of our architecture in AltaRica in order to benefit
from its tools for the analysis of the failure propagation
[17]. This sort of model enables to assess a given archi-
tecture easily with relation to the reliability. Conversely,
this AltaRica modelling does not enable to discuss generic
constraints like a fixed number of redundancies. We have
then decided to supplement this modelling. However, our
modelling of the UAV control system architecture in Event-B
in this article is still incomplete and is partially checked
only. The choice of such a modelling is justified by the
possibility given by Event-B to express explicitly general
properties on the modelled system and to validate these
properties throughout the process of modelling. Thus, the
expression of a property of redundancy on equipment has
an impact on the configuration of the operation modes. For
instance, the system will have back-up modes provided there
exists redundant equipment or equivalent functions, or, the
failure of a non recovered command function will inhibit the
activity of the associated actuator. Our objective is to lead to
a “correct” modelling by construction, which checks clearly
identified properties of safety.
The generalization of our modelling may be possible because
of the genericity of Event-B modelling. For instance, the
number of components in a layer is easily modifiable.
Likewise, the functionalities associated with components
can apply as well to UAV as to autonomous systems of
satellites. But the validation is a difficult level to be taken
while refining our models sufficiently in order to achieve a
testable implementation on a simulator or on our UAV. The
combination of this modelling in Event-B with a modelling
in AltaRica is also another subject on which we have to
keep on working in order to reinforce the confidence on the
reliability of our control system.
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